

Potential Cardinality, I

for Countable First-Order Theories

Douglas Ulrich, Richard Rast, Chris Laskowski

University of Maryland

Rutgers Model Theory Seminar
April 11, 2016

The Main Idea

The Goal: Understand the countable models of a theory Φ

Chosen framework: if $\Phi \leq_B \Psi$ then the countable models of Φ are “more tame” than the countable models of Ψ .

Relatively **easy**: show $\Phi \leq_B \Psi$;

Relatively **hard**: show $\Phi \not\leq_B \Psi$

Theorem (Ulrich, R., Laskowski)

If $\Phi \leq_B \Psi$ then $\|\Phi\| \leq \|\Psi\|$.

Roadmap

1 Borel Reductions

2 Back-and-Forth Equivalence, Scott Sentences, and Potential Cardinality

3 Computations and Consequences

Motivation?

Why study Borel reductions?

Comparing the number of models is pretty coarse. Consider:

- ① Countable sets of \mathbb{Q} -vector spaces
- ② Graphs

These both have \beth_1 countable models, but
Borel reductions can easily show the former is **much smaller** than the latter.

Counterexamples to Vaught's conjecture are **pretty weird**;
Borel reductions give a nice way to make this formal (even given CH).

Borel Reductions

Fix $\Phi, \Psi \in L_{\omega_1\omega}$.

$\text{Mod}_\omega(\Phi)$ and $\text{Mod}_\omega(\Psi)$ are Polish spaces under the **formula topology**.

$f : \text{Mod}_\omega(\Phi) \rightarrow \text{Mod}_\omega(\Psi)$ is a Borel reduction if:

- ① For all $M, N \models \Phi$, $M \cong N$ iff $f(M) \cong f(N)$
- ② For any $\psi \in L_{\omega_1\omega}$ (with parameters from ω)
there is a $\phi \in L_{\omega_1\omega}$ (with parameters from ω)
where $f^{-1}(\text{Mod}_\omega(\Psi \wedge \psi)) = \text{Mod}_\omega(\Phi \wedge \phi)$

(preimages of Borel sets are Borel)

Say $\Phi \leq_B \Psi$.

A Real Example

Let Φ be “linear orders” and Ψ be “real closed fields.” Then $\Phi \leq_B \Psi$.

Proof outline:

- Fix a linear order $(I, <)$
- Pick a sequence $(a_i : i \in I)$ from the monster RCF where $1 \ll a_i$ for all i , and if $i < j$, then $a_i \ll a_j$.
- Let M_I be prime over $\{a_i : i \in I\}$.
- f is “obviously Borel”
- $(I, <) \cong (J, <)$ iff $M_I \cong M_J$.

Establishing Some Benchmarks

Borel reducibility is inherently **relative**; it's hard to gauge complexity of (the countable models of) a sentence on its own.

One fix is to establish some **benchmarks**.

The two most important (for us) are:

- Being **Borel** – a tameness condition which isn't too degenerate
Can stratify this into (e.g.) Π_α^0 for each $\alpha < \omega_1$
- Being **Borel complete** – being maximally complicated

Borel Isomorphism Relations

Fix $\Phi \in L_{\omega_1\omega}$. The following are equivalent:

- ① Isomorphism for Φ is Borel (as a subset of $\text{Mod}_\omega(\Phi)^2$)
- ② There is a countable bound on the Scott ranks of all **countable** models
- ③ There is an $\alpha < \omega_1$ where \equiv_α implies \cong for **countable** models of Φ
- ④ There is a countable bound on the Scott ranks of **all** models of Φ
- ⑤ There is an $\alpha < \omega_1$ where \equiv_α implies $\equiv_{\infty\omega}$ for **all** models of Φ .

Fact: if Φ is Borel and $\Psi \leq_B \Phi$, then Ψ is Borel.

Borel Complete Isomorphism Relations

Fix $\Phi \in L_{\omega_1\omega}$. Φ is **Borel complete** if, for all Ψ , $\Psi \leq_B \Phi$.

Theorem (Friedman, Stanley)

Lots of classes are Borel complete:

- Graphs
- Trees
- Linear orders
- Groups
- Fields
- ...

Fact: If Φ is Borel complete, then Φ is not Borel.

A Serious Question

It's somewhat clear how to show that $\Phi \leq_B \Psi$.

How is it possible to show that $\Phi \not\leq_B \Psi$?

Partial answer: there are some techniques, but they only apply when Φ or Ψ is Borel (and low in the hierarchy).

Very little is known when you can't assume Borel.

Roadmap, II

1 Borel Reductions

2 Back-and-Forth Equivalence, Scott Sentences, and Potential Cardinality

3 Computations and Consequences

Back-and-Forth Equivalence

Let M and N be L -structures. $\mathcal{F} : M \rightarrow N$ is a **back-and-forth system** if:

- ① \mathcal{F} is a nonempty set of partial functions $M \rightarrow N$
- ② All $f \in \mathcal{F}$ preserve L -atoms and their negations
- ③ For all $f \in \mathcal{F}$, all $m \in M$, and all $n \in N$,
there is a $g \in \mathcal{F}$ where $m \in \text{dom}(g)$, $n \in \text{im}(g)$, and $f \subset g$

Say $M \equiv_{\infty\omega} N$ if there is such an \mathcal{F} .

If $M \cong N$ then $M \equiv_{\infty\omega} N$.

If M and N are **countable** and $M \equiv_{\infty\omega} N$, then $M \cong N$.

Back-and-Forth Equivalence, II

$M \equiv_{\infty\omega} N$ means they are the same from an “**intrinsic perspective**.”

More precisely, the following are equivalent:

- $M \equiv_{\infty\omega} N$
- For every $\phi \in L_{\infty\omega}$, $M \models \phi$ iff $N \models \phi$
- In some $\mathbb{V}[G]$, $M \cong N$
- In every $\mathbb{V}[G]$ making M and N countable, $M \cong N$

The relation “ $M \equiv_{\infty\omega} N$ ” is absolute.

Canonical Scott Sentences

Canonical Scott sentences form a canonical invariant of each $\equiv_{\infty\omega}$ -class. Given an L -structure M , a tuple \bar{a} , and an ordinal α , define $\phi_{\alpha}^{\bar{a}}(\bar{x})$ as follows:

$\phi_0^{\bar{a}}(\bar{x})$ is qftp(\bar{a})

$\phi_{\lambda}^{\bar{a}}(\bar{x})$ is $\bigwedge_{\beta < \lambda} \phi_{\beta}^{\bar{a}}(\bar{x})$ for limit λ

$\phi_{\beta+1}^{\bar{a}}(\bar{x})$ is $\phi_{\beta}^{\bar{a}}(\bar{x}) \wedge \left(\forall y \bigvee_{b \in M} \phi_{\beta}^{\bar{a}b}(\bar{x}y) \right) \wedge \bigwedge_{b \in M} \exists y \phi_{\beta}^{\bar{a}b}(\bar{x}y)$

For some minimal α^* , for all $\bar{a} \in M$, $\phi_{\alpha^*}^{\bar{a}}(\bar{x})$ implies $\phi_{\alpha^*+1}^{\bar{a}}(\bar{x})$.

Define $\text{css}(M)$ as $\phi_{\alpha^*}^{\emptyset} \wedge \bigwedge_{\bar{a} \in M} \forall \bar{x} \phi_{\alpha^*}^{\bar{a}}(\bar{x}) \rightarrow \phi_{\alpha^*+1}^{\bar{a}}(\bar{x})$

Canonical Scott Sentences, II

For all M, N , the following are equivalent:

- ① $M \equiv_{\infty\omega} N$
- ② $\text{css}(M) = \text{css}(N)$
- ③ $N \models \text{css}(M)$ (and/or $M \models \text{css}(N)$)

Also, if $|M| \leq \lambda$, then $\text{css}(M) \in L_{\lambda^+\omega}$.

Also, the relation “ $\phi = \text{css}(M)$ ” is absolute.

Also also, the property “ ϕ is in the form of a canonical Scott sentence” is definable and absolute.

Consistency

Proofs in $L_{\infty\omega}$:

- Predictable axiom set
- $\phi, \phi \rightarrow \psi \vdash \psi$
- $\{\phi_i : i \in I\} \vdash \bigwedge_{i \in I} \phi_i$

Proofs are now **trees** which are well-founded but possibly infinite.

$\phi \in L_{\infty\omega}$ is **consistent** if it does not prove $\neg\phi$.

Warning: folklore

Consistency, II

If $\phi \in L_{\omega_1\omega}$ is **formally consistent**, then it has a model.

This is not true for larger sentences:

- Let $\psi = \text{css}(\omega_1, <)$, so ψ has no countable models.
- Let $L = \{<\} \cup \{c_n : n \in \omega\}$.
- Let $\phi = \psi \wedge (\forall x \bigvee_n x = c_n)$

Then ϕ is **formally consistent**, but ϕ has **no models**.

Fact: the property “ ϕ is consistent” is absolute.

Potential Cardinality

Let $\Phi \in L_{\omega_1\omega}$. $\sigma \in L_{\infty\omega}$ is a **potential canonical Scott sentence** of Φ if:

- ① σ has the syntactic form of a CSS
- ② σ is formally consistent
- ③ σ proves Φ

Let $\text{CSS}(\Phi)$ be the set of all these sentences. Let $\|\Phi\| = |\text{CSS}(\Phi)|$.

Easy fact: $I(\Phi, \aleph_0) \leq I_{\infty\omega}(\Phi) \leq \|\Phi\|$.

Note: $I_{\infty\omega}(\Phi)$ is the number of models of Φ up to $\equiv_{\infty\omega}$

The Connection

If $f : \Phi \leq_B \Psi$, then f induces an injection from the countable Scott sentences of Φ to the countable Scott sentences of Ψ .

Theorem (Ulrich, R., Laskowski)

If $f : \Phi \leq_B \Psi$, then get an injection $\bar{f} : \text{CSS}(\Phi) \rightarrow \text{CSS}(\Psi)$.

Proof Idea:

- Fix $\tau \in \text{CSS}(\Phi)$.
- $\bar{f}(\tau)$ is what f *would* take τ to, in some $\mathbb{V}[G]$ making τ countable.
- **Schoenfield**: “ $\exists M \in \text{Mod}_\omega(\Phi) \ (M \models \tau \wedge f(M) \models \sigma)$ ” is absolute
- **General fact**: If G_1 and G_2 are independent, then
 $\mathbb{V}[G_1] \cap \mathbb{V}[G_2] = \mathbb{V}$...
- ... so $\bar{f}(\tau) \in \mathbb{V}$ and $\bar{f}(\tau) \in \text{CSS}(\Psi)$.

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A Few Examples

- If T is \aleph_0 -categorical, $\|T\| = 1$.
- If T is the theory of algebraically closed fields, $\|T\| = \aleph_0$:
Coded by the transcendence degree: 0, 1, 2, ... or “infinite.”
- If $T = (\mathbb{Q}, <, c_q)_{q \in \mathbb{Q}}$, then $\|T\| = \beth_2$.
Models are coded by which 1-types they realize, and how.

All these examples are **grounded** – every potential Scott sentence has a model. **Weirder examples won't have this property.**

Being Borel

FS/HKL: Φ is Borel iff $\Phi \leq_B \cong_\alpha$ for some $\alpha < \omega_1$.

Corollary

If Φ is Borel, $\|\Phi\| < \beth_{\omega_1}$.

Proof Sketch:

- Define the *jump* of Ψ , $J(\Psi)$, to code “multisets of models of Ψ .”
- Define the *limit jump* of Ψ at limit ordinals λ to be $\sqcup_{\alpha < \lambda} J^\alpha(\Psi)$.
- **Easy:** $J^\alpha(\cong_\beta) \sim_B \cong_{\beta+\alpha}$.
- **Easy:** $\|\cong_0\| = \beth_0$
- **Induction:** $\|J^\alpha(\Psi)\| = \beth_{-1+\alpha+1}(\|\Psi\|)$
- **If** $\Phi \leq_B \cong_\alpha$, $\|\Phi\| \leq \beth_{-1+\alpha+1} < \beth_{\omega_1}$.

Being Borel Complete

Proposition

If Φ is Borel complete, $\|\Phi\| = \infty$.

Proof Sketch:

- If Φ is Borel complete, $\text{LO} \leq_B \Phi$, so $\|\text{LO}\| \leq \|\Phi\|$.
- **Folklore:** all ordinals are back-and-forth inequivalent, so
- $\infty = I_{\infty\omega}(\text{LO}) \leq \|\text{LO}\| \leq \|\Phi\|$

Some Excellent Questions

Hanf Number: Is it possible to get $\beth_{\omega_1} \leq \|\Phi\| < \infty$?
Unknown!

Is it possible for $\|\Phi\| = \infty$ when Φ is not Borel complete?
Yes!

Unknown if there are first-order examples

Is it possible for $\|\Phi\| < \beth_{\omega_1}$ when Φ is not Borel?
Yes! And there are first-order examples!

The last “yes!” answers a stubborn conjecture:
Can a first-order theory be neither Borel nor Borel complete?